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Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional?
MONROE H. FREEDMAN*
In this article, Professor Freedman condemns the provi-
sions of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct that
would require a lawyer to reveal his client's perjury to a court.
Viewing these provisions as an assault on the lawyer-client
privilege and the adversary system, which are protected by the
fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution,
Professor Freedman offers the American Lawyer's Code of Con-
duct, for which he served as the Reporter, as an alternative.
Professor Freedman views the American Lawyer's Code as the
preferable alternative to the present ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility because the American Lawyer's Code
preserves "the adversary system and with it the fundamental
rights of all Americans."
Two codes of conduct have been submitted to replace the pre-
sent, widely discredited Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity.1 One is the so-called Model Rules,2 for which Professor Hazard
serves as Reporter.3 The other is the American Lawyer's Code of
Conduct,4 for which I am the Reporter. The Model Rules and the
American Lawyer's Code present strikingly contrasting philoso-
phies regarding the lawyer's responsibilities to clients and the law-
yer's role in society. I think these philosophical differences are
illustrated most dramatically and importantly in the provisions
relating to lawyer-client confidentiality.' As Reporter for the
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University; Reporter for the American Lawyer's Code of
Conduct. This article is a loosely edited version of Professor Freedman's lecture given dur-
ing the University of Miami Law Review Sixth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture
Series on April 3, 1981. The footnotes were added by student editors and reviewed by Pro-
fessor Freedman.
1. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CODE].
2. ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980), reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 1 (Feb. 19,
1980) (special ed.) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft)].
3. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. is a John A. Garver Professor at Yale University and the
Reporter for the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards.
4. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RoscoE POUND--AMERICAN
TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (public discussion
draft released June, 1980) [hereinafter cited as LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft)].
5. Compare MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.7 with LAWYER'S
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American Lawyer's Code, I find myself (in contrast to what Dean
Mentschikoff said) in the position of the establishment for a
change; I think Professor Hazard and his group are the young
Turks.
In a recent article,7 Professor Stark, of the University of Con-
necticut, described the American Lawyer's Code as reflecting the
traditional view of the Anglo-American legal system, which pro-
vides maximum protection to clients' confidences and permits di-
vulgence of those confidences only in carefully limited circum-
stances.' The Model Rules, on the other hand, permit disclosure in
a wide variety of circumstances, and require the lawyer to violate
the client's confidences when the client informs the lawyer about
his perjury.9 The Model Rules thus reverse the evolution towards
upholding attorney-client confidences that began with the Canons
of Professional Ethics 0 and was continued in the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Model Rules have been characterized by a number of
commentators as arrogant," radical, or worse.1 2 I recall, for exam-
ple, that the relatively conservative American College of Trial
Lawyers used the word "vicious," a rather surprising word in this
context, to describe some of these very provisions. Harvard Profes-
sor Andrew Kaufman has said that the provisions will result in an
extraordinary and wholly undesirable change in the lawyer's disclo-
sure responsibilities, threatening disruption of the lawyer-client
relationship.18
CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 4, rule 1.2, Alternatives A & B.
6. Address by Dean Soia Mentachikoff, University of Miami Law Review Sixth Annual
Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series (Apr. 3, 1981) (Dean Mentachikoff referred to Profes-
sor Freedman and his supporters as the young Turks, and to Professor Hazard as represent-
ing the establishment).
7. Stark, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 12 CONN. L. REv. 948 (1980).
8. Stark, supra note 7, at 978-79.
9. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 2, rules 1.7, 3.1, 4.2.
10. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1948). Compare ABA CODE, supra note 1,
Canon 4 with MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 2, rules 1.7, 3.1, 4.2.
11. Lumbard, Setting Standards: The Courts, The Bar, And The Lawyers' Code of
Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 249, 255 (1981).
12. Resolution of the National Organization of Bar Counsel (adopted Feb. 2, 1980), re-
printed in National Organization of Bar Counsel, Report and Recommendations on Study
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Discussion Draft of Jan. 30, 1980) to the ABA
Comm'n on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 96 App. A (Tent. Draft, July 31, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as NOBC Report and Recommendations]; see Lumbard, supra note 12, at
255-58; Kutak Rules Are Totally Rejected at Bar Convention, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 30, 1980,
at 1.
13. Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66
A.B.A. J. 1074 (1980).
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The philosophical implications of the differences between the
two proposed codes are far greater than mere disagreement con-
cerning particular provisions. The American Lawyer's Code recog-
nizes that rules governing lawyers' conduct give substance to, or
detract from, the client's fundamental rights."' Most importantly,
the Lawyer's Code protects the client's constitutional rights be-
cause rules that govern lawyers' conduct give definition to the sixth
amendment right to counsel. 15
At this juncture I would like to reiterate some of the points
made in the Preamble to the American Lawyer's Code.1 When for-
mulating rules of conduct for lawyers, it is essential not to forget
the public interest function that lawyers perform. This function, in
our legal system, is to protect the individual rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights. Rules of conduct should be designed and inter-
preted to enable attorneys to enhance their client's rights, not to
inhibit them. The primary individual rights that lawyers should
protect, and that rules of conduct must respect, are the rights to
due process, counsel, trial by jury, confrontation, and bail, and the
protections against self-incrimination, search and seizure, and
cruel and unusual punishment. Additionally, the right to litigate is
an essential ingredient of freedom of speech and of the right to
petition for redress of grievances. 17
Individual access to attorneys becomes increasingly vital as so-
ciety grows more legally oriented. Due to the enormous volume and
complexity of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory law, ordi-
nary citizens require legal assistance simply to comprehend and to
cope with the multifarious rules governing their actions. The law-
yer, therefore, serves to protect the basic individual right of per-
sonal autonomy, that is, the right to make the decisions that most
affect one's life and values.18 Absent professional assistance, indi-
viduals are often unaware of the options available to them. The
assistance of counsel thus relates significantly to equal protection,
since, if each person is left to his or her own resources without the
assistance of counsel, disproportionate ability to cope with the
complexities of the legal system would produce gross disparities
14. See LAWYER'S CODE (Discussion Draft), supra note 4, Introduction and Preamble.
15. The sixth amendment right to counsel "does not just mean having a lawyer at your
side in court. It means effective counsel; it means a lawyer with whom you can consult; and
it means a lawyer in whom you can confide, because without such confidentiality the lawyer
cannot assist you effectively." Id. Introduction at iv.
16. Id. Preamble at 3-5.
17. See id. at 4.
18. Id.
1981]
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and injustice.19
Our system requires that before any person is significantly af-
fected by society, certain processes must be followed. Competent,
independent, and zealous attorneys are necessary to secure those
rights. Although it may be contended that the stated ideal is too
frequently denied in fact, the response is that the legal community
should strive to make that ideal a reality by drafting and enforcing
appropriate standards. The legal system that gives meaning to ba-
sic American rights of autonomy, counsel, trial by jury, due pro-
cess, equal protection, and others, is the adversary system, 0 which
assures everyone a "champion" against a "hostile world," to help
preserve and enhance individual dignity.
21
The adversary system is also the best available means of de-
termining truth in cases of disputed facts.2 First, the advocate on
each side is responsible for ferreting out all of the facts, policy
questions, and legal authority bearing on the case. The two oppo-
nents then appear before an impartial fact finder, the judge or
jury, with each advocate's position subject to searching challenges
by an adversary through cross-examination and rebuttal.2 8 That
19. Id. at 5.
20. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2 (1975).
21. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE D.FENSE FUNCTION 145-46 (Approved Draft, 1971).
Professor Freedman has stated that:
The concept of a right to counsel is one of the most significant manifesta-
tions of our regard for the dignity of the individual. No person is required to
stand alone against the awesome power of the People of New York or the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America. Rather, every criminal defendant is
guaranteed an advocate-a "champion" against a "hostile world," the "single
voice on which he must rely with confidence that his interests will be protected
to the fullest extent consistent with the rules of procedure and the standards of
professional conduct." In addition, the attorney serves in significant part to as-
sure equality before the law. Thus, the lawyer has been referred to as "the
equalizer," who "places each litigant as nearly as possible on an equal footing
under the substantive and procedural law under which he is tried."
M. FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 5 (footnotes omitted) (quoting ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 145-46).
22. "[T]ruth is a basic value, and the adversary system is one of the most efficient and
fair methods designed for determining it." M. FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 3.
23. In discussing the virtues of the adversary system, Professor Freedman has observed:
That system proceeds on the assumption that the best way to ascertain the truth
is to present to an impartial judge or jury a confrontation between the propo-
nents of conflicting views, assigning to each the task of marshalling and present-
ing the evidence in as thorough and persuasive a way as possible. The truth-
seeking techniques used by the advocates on each side include investigation, pre-
trial discovery, cross-examination of opposing witnesses, and a marshalling of
the evidence in summation. Thus, the judge or jury is given the strongest possi-
[Vol. 35:685
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process has two important effects: it encourages thoroughness and
accuracy in the development of the facts and pertinent law, and it
permits the judge and jury to remain aloof from partisan
involvement.
I think it significant that Professor Hazard, in discussing the
general law relevant to legal ethics, chose to refer to the laws of
tort and agency24 with citation to the Restatement of Agency, but
made no reference to constitutional law and no citation to the Bill
of Rights. What I would like to focus on today are the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
privilege against self-incrimination "is the essential mainstay of
our adversary system";25 similarly, the effective assistance of coun-
sel has been described as "a defendant's most fundamental right
'for it affects his ability to assert any other right[s] he may
have.' ",6 The interrelationship between the fifth amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to
counsel is clear. As Justice Rehnquist has said, "the Sixth Amend-
ment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications be-
tween the accused and his attorney. 2 7 Chief Jdstice Burger has
reasoned that this lawyer-client privilege is rooted in the impera-
tive need for confidence and trust between lawyer and client, and
the need for the lawyer, as an advocate and a counselor, to know
all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation.2 8
Accordingly, as Professor Whitebread noted in his treatise on crim-
inal procedure,2' the Supreme Court has extended the fifth amend-
ment protection to an attorney for the benefit of his client's privi-
lege for the express purpose of encouraging the uninhibited
exchange of information between citizens and their attorneys.8 0
The Supreme Court recently reiterated and reaffirmed these
ble view of each side, and is put in the best possible position to make an accu-
rate and fair judgment.
Id. at 4.
24. Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful
Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 669 (1981).
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
26. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quoting Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1956)).
27. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
29. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1980).
30. Id. § 14.02 at 257.
1981]
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basic precepts in Upjohn Co. v. United States.31 Justice Rehn-
quist, speaking for eight members of the Court, concluded that the
crux of the attorney-client privilege is the necessity that the lawyer
know all the essential facts to properly represent his client.2 Assis-
tance of counsel can only be safely used when it is free from the
apprehension of disclosure. Thus, the sixth amendment right to
counsel and the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion have been inextricably linked with the lawyer-client privilege
as constitutional expressions of the adversary system.
The Model Rules, with their assault on confidentiality, attack
the adversary system and therefore the Constitution. 8 Professor
Stark attributes this position in the Model Rules to the ABA Com-
mission's overriding skepticism about the adversary system.",
Robert Kutak, the chairman of the Commission, has denied any
hostility to the adversary system,"8 but he has admitted on behalf
31. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). In Upjohn, a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals made payments
to a foreign government official in order to benefit the company's overseas operations. The
company's general counsel was made aware of these facts and began an investigation regard-
ing these "questionable payments." Id. at 386. The company attorney sent out confidential
questionnaires to foreign managers requesting information. The IRS, during a tax investiga-
tion, issued a summons demanding that the company turn over both the confidential ques-
tionnaires and the notes from attorney interviews. Upjohn refused to produce the docu-
ments "on the grounds that they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege and constituted the work product of attorneys prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion." Id. at 388.
32. Id. at 389-91.
33. Professor Stark believes that the MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 2,
modify the adversary function in that:
(1) The Rules propose new restraints and new obligations on attorneys in-
volved in ex parte proceedings and proceedings against unrepresented parties
(2) The Rules propose a new obligation on attorneys to keep litigation mov-
ing forward ...
(3) The Rules establish new obligations of fairness to opposing lawyers and
parties in negotiation and other litigation processes ...
(4) The Rules expand the attorney's obligation to deal candidly with courts
and tribunals about legal authority ...
(5) The Rules expand the attorney's obligation of candor with respect to
facts ....
(6) . . . [T]he Rules impose on the attorney greatly expanded obligations to
prevent or rectify the consequences of a client's misconduct, even if this requires
disclosure of client confidences to a court or a third person.
Stark, supra note 7, at 965-66 (footnotes omitted).
34. Professor Stark states that several of the comments to the Model Rules "express
the drafters' deep concern, their overriding skepticism about the adversary system-about
the capacity of courts, as presently structured, to achieve substantial justice .... " Id. at
965 (see MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 2, rule 3.1, Comment, and rule 3.2,
Comment).
35. See Kutak, Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 36 Bus. LAW 573
[Vol. 35:685
ARE THE MODEL RULES UNCONSTITUTIONAL
of his commission that "as useful as [the model of the adversary
system] may have been in an earlier day, it simply is neither accu-
rate nor functional as an organizing principle around which we can
order our thinking about professional responsibility in 1980.''31
Let me illustrate the constitutional aspect with a recent case.3 7
A man named Henry was in prison, pending trial following his in-
dictment for robbery. The FBI paid Nichols, Henry's cellmate, to
report any incriminating statements that Henry might make as
they were talking together. 8 Nichols, according to the Chief Jus-
tice's majority opinion, "intentionally creat[ed] a situation likely to
induce Henry to make incriminating statements."'8 The Court held
that evidence of incriminating conversations between Henry and
Nichols, which came to the government through Nichols, had to be
suppressed as a violation of Henry's sixth amendment right to
counsel even though Henry's lawyer had not yet been appointed. 0
Under the Model Rules, Henry's own lawyer would be re-
quired to do what his cellmate could not, that is, to establish a
relationship of trust and confidence, to deliberately elicit incrimi-
nating information, and then to divulge that information to the
Court.4' Former Judge Marvin Frankel, who has served as an influ-
ential member of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Profes-
sional Standards, and who, oddly enough, has supported these
novel and radical proposals for destroying the adversary system,
wrote, in an often cited and quoted opinion, that the privilege of
confidentiality "would be a thin illusion if the government could
(1981); Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 47
(1980); Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations About the Proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 1 (1980); Kutak, Evaluating the
Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1016.
36. Pacific Business News, July 31, 1980 (ABA Bonus Edition), at 18.
37. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
38. Id. at 266.
39. Id. at 274.
40. Id. Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981) (use of psychiatrist's adverse testi-
mony at penalty phase of murder trial violated accused's fifth and sixth amendment protec-
tions). In Estelle, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that when the psychiatrist went
beyond simply reporting to the court on the issue of competence and testified for
the prosecution at the penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent's future
dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like that of an agent of
the State recounting unwarned statements made in a post-arrest custodial set-
ting. During the psychiatric evaluation, respondent assuredly was "faced with a
phase of the adversary system" and was "not in the presence of [a] person[ ]
acting solely in his interest."
Id. at 1875 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)) (brackets in original)
(emphasis added).
41. See MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 2, rules 1.7, 3.1, 4.2.
1981]
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have for the asking what it has, in rare lapses, sought by less gen-
teel means."42 If the Model Rules were adopted, there would be no
need for the Government to pay Nichols to induce trust and confi-
dence and elicit self-incriminating information for the prosecution,
because the Kutak Commission would have the lawyer do it.
Although it is sometimes said that the perjury problem is rare,
the perjury problem is present in every case, because from the first
interview the lawyer must decide how to handle that problem,
should it arise. The lawyer must also establish a relationship of
trust and confidence with the client. In the discussion draft of the
Model Rules, a comment acknowledges that requiring the lawyer
to give the client a Miranda warning may result in less effective
representation."' The final draft has deleted that acknowledgment,
but the effect of the warning nevertheless remains the same."
Moreover, word of lawyers' practice of betraying clients gets out
anyway, as was the case with the Washington, D.C. public de-
fender's office. 5 Perjury, of course, would still occur under the
Model Rules, if they were adopted. The difference is that lawyers
would be ignorant of it, and ignorant of a good deal more besides.
Clients would not know what information to divulge to the lawyer
and what information to hold back because it would be too danger-
ous to divulge. Indeed, there would probably be more perjury
under the Model Rules, because lawyers would lose the opportu-
nity to dissuade their clients. 6
Finally, the current revision of the Model Rules, referred to as
the final draft, cites none of the foremost constitutional authorities
on point to support its position that a lawyer has an obligation to
reveal his client's perjury to the court. 7 Although there are blocks
of string citations in the final draft, many are not relevant or com-
plete and do not contain a single reference to the constitutional
authorities I have been discussing. The only constitutional authori-
ties that arguably support the position of the Model Rules are
42. In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
43. MODEL RULES (Discussion Draft), supra note 2, rule 1.4(b); see NOBC Report and
Recommendations, supra note 12, § V, Comment to rule 1.4(b) at 69.
44. ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT rule 1.2(e) (Proposed Final Draft, May 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES (Final Draft)].
45. J. ALLEN, ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A STREET
CRIMINAL XXiii-XXiV, 153-54 (P. Heymann & D. Kelly eds. 1977).
46. See generally Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1975) (if client knows that
damaging information can be obtained more readily after disclosure, he will be reluctant to
confide in his lawyer, making it difficult for lawyer to give fully informed advice).
47. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 45, rule 3.3(a)(4).
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Harris v. New York 8 and United States v. Haven." Those cases
are cited by the Model Rules for the proposition that "defendants
must testify truthfully or suffer consequences." 50 They deal, how-
ever, with the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment, that
is, unlawful searches and seizures resulting in inadmissible evi-
dence. Unlike lawyer-client confidences, the exclusionary rule does
not have constitutional status, and, moreover, it is disfavored by
the Supreme Court.51 In both Harris and Haven, the Government
obtained evidence of a crime through an unlawful search and
seizure. Although the evidence was excluded from use in proving
the prosecution's case, the government was permitted to use the
unlawfully seized evidence for impeachment purposes when the de-
fendant took the stand and denied the crime.2 Interestingly, in
these two cases the Supreme Court expressed no criticism of the
lawyers who had elicited the false testimony, although, of course,
the lawyers knew about the contradictory suppressed evidence.
The Court merely held that when a defendant commits perjury,
the exclusionary rule will not require that the perjurious defendant
be "free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent ut-
terances 5 3 or with real evidence in the government's possession."
In other words, the defendant can testify perjuriously, and obvi-
ously with the knowledge of his lawyer, but if the defendant does
testify perjuriously, his credibility can be impeached despite the
exclusionary rule. That is hardly authority for the proposition that
the defendant's attorney has the obligation to reveal the perjury to
the court; indeed, if the attorney had such an obligation, impeach-
ment by the government would be unnecessary.
Judge James G. Exum, Jr. of the North Carolina Supreme
Court has stated that the lawyer is the defendant's only advocate.55
The American Bar Association describes the lawyer as the defend-
ant's only champion against a hostile world. Judge Exum
stresses that the lawyer cannot also become the client's accuser.
48. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
49. 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
50. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 45, rule 3.3(a)(4), Comment at 133.
51. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975).
52. 446 U.S. at 621-23; 401 U.S. at 223-24.
53. 401 U.S. at 226.
54. 446 U.S. at 627-28.
55. Exum, The Perjurious Criminal Defendant: A Solution to his Lawyer's Dilemma, 6
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: JOURNALISM, LAW, MEDICINE 16 (1980).
56. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 145-46.
57. Exum, supra note 55.
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A conviction under our system must be at the hands of the jury,
not the defendant's lawyer. The Model Rules would have it other-
wise. The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct would preserve the
adversary system and with it the fundamental rights of all
Americans.
